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LET'S GET REAL: QUILTING A PRINCIPLED
APPROACH TO ADOLESCENT EMPOWERMENT
IN HEALTH CARE DECISION-MAKING
Jennifer L. Rosato*
INTRODUCTION
"Where the reason fails the rule should not apply." 1
There are a number of contrasting images of adolescents reflected
in existing law. One image is of adolescents being judged on their abil-
ities (as in the tort context); 2 another image is one of adolescents be-
ing presumed competent and treated as adults (as in the juvenile
justice context). 3 In the health care context, however, even older ado-
lescents are presumed incompetent to make basic health care
decisions.4
* Professor, Brooklyn Law School. My heartfelt thanks go out to my terrific, hard-working
research assistants Erin Barton, Elissia Greenberg, Naomi Johnson, and Mitzi Lieberman:
DePaul University College of Law, its Law Review, Professor of Law Michelle Oberman and
fellow traveler Rhonda Gay Hartman. Thanks to the support of my colleague Larry Solan, who
read a draft and provided me an additional forum in which to share these ideas. The support of
Brooklyn Law School also has been invaluable, particularly its summer grant program adminis-
tered by Joan Wexler.
1. Brown v. Shelby, 332 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1960).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORis 283A (1965) (stating a minor's standard of conduct is
based on that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circum-
stances); see also Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conun-
drum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1304 (2000) [hereinafter Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy]
(claiming that tort law, as opposed to contract law, allows adolescents to sue and be sued after
taking into account the minors diminished maturity based on his/her age).
3. This presumption is reflected primarily in transfer or waiver statutes, which increasingly
permit or require juveniles who commit certain crimes to be tried as adults. See, e.g., Barry C.
Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems' Responses to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 189.
195-212 (1998); BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS: A
NATIONAL ASSESSMENT Ch. 6, at 170-82 (Oct. 2000); cf Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy, supra
note 2, at 1294-1301 (stating that with transfer and waiver statutes there is a presumption of
capacity without an assessment of whether the minor actually has it).
4. See Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy, supra note 2, at 1306; Jennifer L. Rosato, The Ultimate
Test of Autonomy: Should Minors Have A Right to Make Decisions Regarding Life-Sustaining
Treatment?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Rosato, Life-Sustaining Treatment]; see
also Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547 (2000).
For other references to these contrasting images, see Donald L. Beschle, The Juvenile Justice
Counterrevolution: Responding to Cognitive Dissonance in the Law's View of the Decision-Mak-
ing Capacity of Minors, 48 EMORY L.J. 65, 88-95 (1999); ROGER J.R. LEVESQUE, ADOLESCENTS,
SEX, AND THE LAW: PREPARING AI)oLSECENTrs FOR REASONABLE CITIZENSHIP' 331 (2000).
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This presumed incompetence pervades the law governing health
care decision-making. For the most part, persons under the age of
eighteen cannot make basic health care decisions on their own. 5 Al-
though obtaining an abortion is a constitutional right for young
women, there are significant restrictions on that right.6 And when it
comes to participating in health care decisions that would assist
others-such as participation in clinical trials-sixteen-year-old ado-
lescents are treated like seven year olds. 7
This disparate treatment of children would not be problematic were
it based in reality, but it is not. There is no set of findings that sug-
gests that most children under the age of eighteen lack the capacity to
make these decisions.8 In fact, evidence suggests that some minors
gain the requisite capacity considerably before reaching adulthood.
Yet, as Section II illustrates, the existing legal doctrine permits minors
to make decisions only in a narrow set of circumstances that are unre-
lated to the minor's actual capacities and is unresponsive to their need
to develop decision-making competence prior to adulthood.
This Article proposes changes in the existing doctrine that would
make it more based in the realities of the older adolescent. 9 First, this
Article will analyze the weaknesses in existing law as they pertain to
adolescent health care decision-making.' 0 Second, this Article will ex-
amine the lessons that can be learned from the disciplines of develop-
mental psychology and bioethics to inform a more reality-based
jurisprudence in this area.'' Finally, this Article will propose changes
to existing law that are informed by these disciplines and quilted to-
5. See Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy, supra note 2, at 1306; Rosato, Life-Sustaining Treat-
ment, supra note 4, at 11; see also Christine M. Hanisco, Note, Acknowledging the Hypocrisy:
Granting Minors the Right to Choose Their Medical Treatment, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 899,
920 (2000).
6. See also discussion infra notes 22-54 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Rosato, The Ethics of Clinical Trials: A Child's View, 28 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 362, 366, 369 (2000) [hereinafter Rosato, Clinical Trials] (stating under existing law,
older children can assent but not consent). A committee recently proposed that certain mature
adolescents be permitted to enroll in clinical trials without their parents' consent or knowledge.
See Susan Okie, FDA Urged to Broaden Study Rules; Current Policy Prevents Teens From Enroll-
ing Without Parents' Consent, WASH. PosTr, July 31, 2001, at A2.
8. See discussion infra notes 95-169 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Emily Buss, Confronting Developmental Barriers to the Empowerment of Child
Clients, 84 CORNELL L . REV. 895, 919 (1999) (advocating for the law to recognize the "in-
creased prevalence of certain capacities" as children mature rather than assuming that they are
not as capable as adults); Donald N. Bersoff & David J. Glass, The Not-So Weisman: The Su-
preme Court's Continuing Misuse of Social Science Research, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
279, 302 (1995) (discussing the need for "empirically justified decisions that match the real
world.").
10. See infra notes 14-93 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 94-185 and accompanying text.
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gether to create a more coherent doctrine than the one that currently
exists.12 Quilting accurately reflects this analytical process, as it in-
volves intellectually sewing together seemingly unrelated patches to
create a unique and meaningful whole.' 3 The ultimate objective is to
respect and nurture the burgeoning autonomy rights of minors at the
brink of adulthood while protecting them from harm where it is
necessary.
II. ADOLESCENTS IN HEALTH CARE: PARENTS RULE
"Obey Thy Mother and Father-and Anyone Else Bigger Than You
Are."14
The law that governs children in the health care decision-making
context is fairly well established and has not changed significantly
over the last two decades. The general rule is that children under
eighteen are not permitted to consent to or refuse medical treatment
without their parents' consent.' 5 In fact, only the parents' consent
matters: the parents' decision trumps even if the child disagrees.' 6
This general rule is justified by two equally strong rationales. The
first is that children are not mature enough to make these decisions
for themselves: they lack the requisite capacity and experience. 17 On
their own, it is believed that they will make bad decisions and will be
vulnerable to the pressure of others.' 8 As stated by the United States
12. See infra notes 186-223 and accompanying text.
13. JANET CATHERINE BERLO, QUILTING LESSONS NOTES FROM THE SCRAP BAG OF A
WRITER & QUILTER 59 (2001). In this book the author reflects on (among other things) the
similarities between writing and quilting.
14. Patricia Keith-Spiegel, Children's Rights as Participants in Research, in CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS AND THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS (Gerald P. Koocher ed., 1976).
15. FAY A. RoZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRAC'rICAL GUIDE 5.1 (3d ed. 1998).
The common law stated that a minor was unable to consent to medical treatment by themselves
and, with the exception of emergencies or other impractical situations, imposed a requirement
on doctors to seek the consent of the minor's parent before performing any medical procedures.
Id.
16. See Scott, supra note 4, at 566 (discussing a battery as when medical treatment is given
without informed consent and because minors can not give that type of consent, the parents
must do so for them even if the child does not agree); see also RozovsKY, supra note 15, at 5.1.
17. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444-45 (1980) (noting that because of ado-
lescents' lack of experience, the state is justified in requiring parental consent for such events as
having an operation); see also Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy, supra note 2, at 1308 (discussing
that minors are presumed incapable of making medical decisions).
18. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (plurality opinion). Because children are often
unable to recognize the gravity of their choices, the United States Supreme Court has a history
of limiting their freedoms when they need to make "important, affirmative choices with poten-
tially serious consequences." Id. The Court has often taken a protective role with minors be-
cause their "inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to
evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much more
2002]
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Supreme Court, "[m]ost children, even in adolescence, simply are not
able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions, including
their need for medical care or treatment.19
The second rationale is that parents deserve deference to make de-
cisions on behalf of their children. This reasoning is based on com-
mon law and constitutional law, and reflects the idea that parents
know best what will serve their own child's interests. To perform their
role most effectively in a free society, parents need the space-free
from governmental interference-to make these decisions. 2
0
Exceptions to the parental consent rule do exist, but they are fairly
narrow and unrelated to the adolescent's actual ability to make the
decision at issue. The most common exceptions are constitutional,
(notably abortion), status-based, and those based on certain diseases
or conditions. 21 The existing law reflects a great reluctance to recog-
nize a true mature minor exception, one that would give decision-
making power to an older adolescent capable of making the decision
at issue.
A. Minors' Constitutional Right(s): The Case of Abortion
Minors have been granted some constitutional rights, even though
the level of protection given to them has been less than that for
adults. 22 In the area of health care, for example, minors have been
apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult." Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988).
19. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979); cf Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 242-43
(1972) (Douglas J., dissenting in part) (discussing that in freedom of religion case, lower court
should have consulted teenagers on their religious views rather than simply defer to parents).
20. Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine When Parents Should Make
Health Care Decisions for Their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73 TEMPLE L. REV. 1, 6-7 n. 25
(2000) [hereinafter Rosato, Bioethics]; see also Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal
Models of Children and the Parent-Child Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REV. 345, 374-75 (1997) (dis-
cussing the U.S. Supreme Court's use of the "Traditional Model" of the parent-child relationship
where the parent has the right to make the decisions for the child and the child's rights are
essentially nonexistent).
21. See Rosato, Bioethics, supra note 20, at 6-7 n.22 (stating that because parents have a fun-
damental right to make decisions for the care, custody, and control of their minor children, it
takes a compelling state interest for the government to interfere); see also Dolgin, supra note 20,
at 379 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-03 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 521, 534-35 (1925) as examples of the U.S. Supreme Court protecting parental rights
from government intrusion); James Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking
the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1371, 1372 (1994) (arguing that any attempt
by the state to improve the lives of children is restricted by parents' fundamental rights).
22. See, e.g., Emily Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, 48 BuFF. L. REV. 785, 794 (2000);
Jennifer C. Friedman, Parental Notice in State Abortion Statutes: Filling the Gap in Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 437, 443-44 (1998); see also Catherine J. Ross, An
Emerging Right for Mature Minors to Receive Information, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 223, 223-24,
233-42 (1999) (discussing the First Amendment).
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granted the right to obtain an abortion. 23 Consequently, states are not
permitted to place an undue burden on a girl's right to obtain an
abortion.
24
Even with this restriction, states are permitted to limit a girl's abor-
tion right in significant ways without running afoul of the federal Con-
stitution.25 A girl below the age of eighteen cannot obtain a first-
trimester abortion on her own, unlike an adult woman who generally
can early in her pregnancy.26 In contrast, a pregnant girl must involve
either her parents or a court in her decision. 27 The parental involve-
ment required by the state can be categorized as one-parent consent,
28
two-parent consent, 29 one-parent notice,30 or two-parent notice.
31 If
23. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 435 (1990); Planned Parenthood of Cent.
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 73-75 (1976); see also J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Minors As Medi-
cal Decision Makers: The Pretextual Reasoning Of The Court In The Abortion Cases, 7 MICH. J.
GENDER L. 65, 67-68 (2000) [hereinafter Ehrlich, Medical Decision-Makers]; J. Shoshanna Ehr-
lich, Journey Through The Courts: Minors, Abortion And The Quest For Reproductive Fairness,
10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 3, 26-27 (1998) [hereinafter Ehrlich, Reproductive Fairness].
24. See Rosato, Bioethics, supra note 20, at 16-20; see also Katheryn D. Katz, The Pregnant
Child's Right to Self-Determination, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1119, 1141-42 (1999).
25. Under state constitutions that provide more expansive rights, fewer restrictions may be
permitted. See discussion infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text (discussing Farmer decision,
which invalidated New Jersey's parental notification statute under state's equal protection
clause). Federal laws essentially represent the floor of constitutional decisions, and state laws
the ceiling. Whereas the federal Constitution serves as the minimum protection afforded to a
minor's right to privacy, the states can provide even more under their individual state constitu-
tions. See Rachel Weissman, What Choice Do They Have? Protecting Pregnant Minors' Repro-
ductive Rights Using State Constitutions, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 129, 143 (1999).
26. The undue burden standard applies to adult women, as well as minors. See Steinberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921, 938-46 (2000) (applying undue burden standard to review "partial
birth" abortion statute). Although theoretically adult women are subject to the same standard
as girls, fewer restrictions on their abortion rights are permitted. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887-95 (1992) (striking down spousal con-
sent provision under undue burden standard but upholding parental consent provisions).
27. The framework for reviewing a girl's abortion decisions was articulated in Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II). Although Bellotti II initially was considered an advisory
opinion, it is now well-established as setting forth the legal framework for reviewing the constitu-
tionality of minor abortion statutes. See Ehrlich, Reproductive Fairness, supra note 23, at 50, 55.
28. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-303 (2001); KAN. STAr. ANN. § 65-6705 (2000); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152 (West 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12 (West 2001); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299 [1299.3015] (West 2000); CAL. HEAUTH & SAF. CODE § 123450 (West
2001); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT ANN. § 3206 (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-44-31 (Law. Co-op.
2000); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 48.375 (West 2001); IND. CODe ANN. § 16-34-2-4 (2001). Most states
have one-parent consent statutes. See Planned Parenthood of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Attorney
General, 677 N.E.2d 101, 107-08 (Mass. 1997).
29. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 2001).
30. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-204 (2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-118 (Michie
2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1783 (2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-112 (2001); MD. CODE
ANN. HEALTH GEN. § 20-103 (2000); see statutes cited in Katz, supra note 24, at n.180 (citing
examples from Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, and
West Virginia as examples of states that use one-parent notification statutes).
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the girl does not wish to involve her parents in the manner the state
prescribes, she must obtain the court's permission through a judicial
bypass.32 In this proceeding, the minor ordinarily must show either
that she is mature enough to obtain an abortion or that the abortion is
in her best interests. 33 Although a few judicial bypass procedures
have been struck down as unconstitutional under the federal Constitu-
tion,34 others have been upheld.
35
Overall, the existing doctrine is out of touch with reality. For exam-
ple, the doctrine reflects an overwhelming desire for parents to be in-
volved,36 even though the reality is that such forced involvement is
unnecessary 37 and, worse yet, may be harmful to the minor.38 Specifi-
cally, it is important for the law to recognize that for some girls, just
notifying a parent can be as significant a burden on her decision as
31. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 144.343 (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-1-03 (1999); cf UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (2000) (requiring doctors, "if possible," to notify the minor's parent
before performing the abortion).
32. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241 V (Michie 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03
(2001): MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-212 (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West
2001); LA. REV. STAT ANN. § 40:1299.35.5(B)(4) (West 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12
B(l)(a)(iii) (West 2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152B (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65-6705(a) (2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-303(b) (2000); CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE
§ 123450(b) (West 2001); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3206(c) (2001). See generally Wallace J.
Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity to Choose, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1873, 1889-92 (1996); Suellyn Scarnecchia & Julie Kunce Field, Judging Girls: Decision
Making in Parental Consent to Abortion Cases, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 75, 89-93 (1995) (both
reviewing judicial bypass provisions).
33. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-204 (2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299(A)(5)
(West 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152B (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(e)(2)
(2000); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123450(c) (West 2000); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3206(d) (2001). See generally Friedman, supra note 22, at 448 (discussing the requirements for
judicial bypass as including either the requirement of a best interests determination or that the
minor is mature enough to make an informed decision).
For cases evaluating the level of maturity required to make an abortion decision, see Ex Parte
Anonymous, 2001 WL 587223 (Ala. 2001); In re Anonymous, 771 So.2d 1043 (Ala. 2000); In re
Jane Doe, 19 S.W.3d 346, 358-361 (Tex. 2000); In re Anonymous, 253 Neb. 485 1044-47 (1997).
34. Planned Parenthood of S. Arizona v. Neely, 804 F. Supp. 1210, 1216 (D. Ariz. 1992) (hold-
ing one-parent consent law is unconstitutional); Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v.
Farmer, 762 A.2d 620, 630 (N.J. 2000) (finding most federal cases have upheld state's parental
participation laws). Other bypass procedures have been found unconstitutional under state con-
stitutions that provide greater protection of a minor's abortion right. See Weissman, supra note
25, at 152.
35. See Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254, 257 (4th Cir. 1997) (upholding parent consent);
Planned Parenthood of the Blue Ridge v. Camblos, 155 F.3d 352, 255, 384 (4th Cir. 1998); see
also Weissman, supra note 25, at 140 (discussing several federal court decisions involving judicial
bypass provisions that have been upheld).
36. See discussion infra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
37. See Preston A. Britner et al., Evaluating Juveniles' Competence to Make Abortion Deci-
sions: How Social Science Can Inform the Law, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 35, 59-60 (1998).
38. See discussion infra notes 40-53 and accompanying text; Weissman, supra note 25, at 129.
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obtaining parental consent.39 Moreover, most pregnant girls consult
with a parent and do not need to be coerced into doing so.40 The law
operates under the mistaken notion that even though a minor may be
too immature to have an abortion, she is mature enough to make ma-
jor medical decisions related to her pregnancy and subsequently to
make decisions regarding the upbringing of the child. This selective
burdening of the abortion right is not justified
a.4
Recently, one court stopped to carefully consider the actual exper-
iences of pregnant teens before finding a restriction on teen abortion
unconstitutional. In Planned Parenthood v. Farmer,42 the New Jersey
Supreme Court struck down New Jersey's parental notification law as
violative of the state's equal protection clause. 43 The court concluded
that it was unconstitutional for a pregnant minor to be permitted to
make all of her health care decisions during pregnancy-including
whether she will have a caesarean section-but not permit the same
minor to terminate her pregnancy. 44
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court did not speak directly to a
minor's competence to make these kind of decisions, the court took a
reality-based perspective and focused on the actual burdens faced by
girls seeking an abortion. 45 It found that notifying parents-even
without requiring their consent-can be a burden on a minor and may
prevent her from exercising her constitutional rights. 46  Requiring
such permission delays the minor's decision when time is of the es-
sence and, worse yet, may lead to parental interference in the form of
parental disappointment and disapproval, physical or emotional
abuse, withdrawal of financial support, or actual obstruction of the
abortion decision. 47 Moreover, the judicial bypass procedure does not
39. See Farmer, 762 A.2d at 640-41; see also Rosato, Bioethics, supra note 20, at 16-19; Fried-
man, supra note 22, at 455-56 (urging that notice and consent statutes should have similar proce-
dural protections).
40. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Committee on Adolescence, The Adolescent's Right to Confi-
dential Care When Considering Abortion, 97 PEDIATRICS 746 (1996) [hereinafter AAP,
Abortion].
41. See Ehrlich, Medical Decision-Makers, supra note 23, at 84.
42. See Farmer, 762 A.2d at 637-38.
43. Id. at 638.
44. id. at 636.
45. Id. at 635.
46. Id. at 634. See generally Rebekah Saul, Teen Pregnancy: Progress Meets Politics, The Alan
Guttenmacher Institute, available at http://www.gottmacher.org/pubs/journals/gro20306.html
(last visited March 7, 2002) (stating research indicates that requiring parental involvement, ei-
ther through consent or notification, discourages minors not only from seeking abortions but
family planning services in general).
47. See Farmer, 762 A.2d at 634; accord Rosato, Bioethics, supra note 20, at 18 n.94; Ehrlich,
Reproductive Fairness, supra note 23, at 17.
2002]
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alleviate that burden: in the bypass process, her anonymity may be
breached, she must seek legal representation, and she must somehow
absent herself from school without her parents' knowledge. 48 All of
these impediments can cause the pregnant girl to delay her decision,
leading to a more costly and dangerous abortion or foreclosing the
option altogether.49 The Farmer court concluded that these barriers
to obtaining an abortion were not justified by any competing interests,
including the desire to promote family communication.
5°
Most courts, however, do not appear to take the reality-based ap-
proach reflected in the Farmer decision. 51 Instead, the courts (led by
the United States Supreme Court) continue to hold on to the outmo-
ded presumptions of juvenile incompetency 52 and parental defer-
ence. 53 The overall result is a doctrine that fails to recognize the
actual competence of minors and the burdens they endure in attempt-
ing to exercise their right to health care. 54 The other exceptions to the
parental consent rule are similarly limited.
B. Status Exception
Most exceptions to the parental consent rule are not constitutional
in nature, but are based on a state's statutory or common law. The
status exception is one such exception, which includes exemptions for
marriage, military service, emancipation, and the like. 55 Some types
48. See Farmer, 762 A.2d at 635. See generally Ehrlich, Reproductive Fairness, supra note 23,
at 15-16 (criticizing Massachusetts court for minimizing the burdens minors face in going to court
for judicial bypass proceeding).
49. See Farmer, 762 A.2d at 626, 635; see also Weissman, supra note 25, at 129; Ehrlich, Repro-
ductive Fairness, supra note 23, at 16 n.94; AAP, Abortion, supra note 40.
50. See Farmer, 762 A.2d at 637; see also Ehrlich, Reproductive Fairness, supra note 23, at 2
(criticizing parental involvement laws as "limiting abortion rights rather than promoting family
communication.").
51. See Rosato, Bioethics, supra note 20, at 16-20; Katz, supra note 24, at nn. 294-98; Ehrlich,
Reproductive Fairness, supra note 23, at 8-9, n.42.
52. See Bersoff & Glass, supra note 9, at 295-96 (noting courts continue to ignore relevant
evidence that proves minor's capacity, choosing instead to rely on assumptions of incompe-
tency); Ehrlich, Reproductive Fairness, supra note 23, at 27 (the Court's abortion law reflects a
"distorted vision of the decisional capacity of teens."). The existing studies actually show that
older adolescents possess the competence necessary to make an abortion decision. See also infra
note 106.
53. See Rosato, Bioethics, supra note 20, at 16. See generally Dwyer, supra note 21, at 1373
(parental rights are comparable to the traditional rights that husbands had to control their wives
in that both represent a more powerful group dominating a less powerful one, yet we continue to
uphold the notion of parental rights).
54. See Ehrlich, Reproductive Fairness, supra note 23, at 23-24 (abortion is thought of as some-
how different from other medical decisions and thus an examination of the minor's decisional
capacity can be avoided).
55. See Rosato, Life-Sustaining Treatment, supra note 4, at 28 (minors who possess a particular
status can make decisions for themselves without parental consent).
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of status, such as emancipation, act as a proxy for maturity.5 6 Emanci-
pation primarily considers financial independence as a measure of the
maturity that an adult possesses to make major life decisions.
5 7
Other types of status do not provide even a rough approximation of
competence. These exceptions include married minors, 58 pregnant
minors,5 9 and minor parents. 60 The simple fact that a minor is married
or has children does not make him or her more mature. Actually, the
opposite may be true.6' These exceptions appear to exist because of
an ease of application and a need for consistency, rather than a recog-
nition of the minor's autonomy.
62
The following example illustrates the limitations in using status
rather than autonomy as a guide. A teen mother who goes to a pedia-
trician's office because her baby is ill or needs a check-up has the right
to consent to the baby's medical care. If the baby's grandmother tries
to interfere, the court is likely to defer to the teen mother because of
her status as a mother and the constitutional protection that accompa-
56. See Ehrlich, Medical Decision-Makers, supra note 23, at 78: cf Carol Sanger & Eleanor
Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in Modern Times, 25 U. MICH. J.L. 239, 259-
60 (1992) (stating emancipation was designed to be a way to legitimize a minor's independence
and ability to make decisions before they reached age eighteen).
57. See Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 56, at 262 (stating "legal emancipation was intended
to recognize and validate, but not to create, physical and financial independence between minors
and parents."); Ehrlich, Medical Decision-Makers, supra note 23, at 78 (noting emancipation
honors the ability of minors to make appropriate life choices).
58. See Rosato, Life-Sustaining Treatment, supra note 4, at 26 (citing examples from Alabama,
Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, and Michigan).
59. See id. at 26 (citing examples from Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Maryland, and Minne-
sota). Some states do place restrictions on pregnant minors' decision-making ability. For exam-
ple, Delaware law provides that a minor must be twelve years old before she can consent to
treatment. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 214.185 (Michie 2001).
60. See Rosato, Life-Sustaining Treatment, supra note 4, at 26. Generally, minor parents are
given authority to make decisions for their children but not for themselves. See DEL. CODE.
ANN. tit. 13, § 707(b)(4) (Michie 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2(a)(2) (2000); MINN. STAI.
ANN. § 144,342 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.6-1 (2001). Some statutes, however, do
allow minors to consent to treatment for themselves as well as for their children. See ALA. CODE
§ 22-8-5 (2001); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.025(a)(3) (Michie 2001); ILL. COMP. STAT. 410/210-1
(West 2000); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTrH-GEN. II § 20-102(a)(2) (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 112, § 12F (West 2001).
61. See Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Decisional Autonomy for Medical Care: Physician
Perceptions and Practices, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 87, 93 (2001) [hereinafter Hartman,
Physician Perceptions]; cf State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 911-14 (1975) (noting a state may
not require that unmarried minors get parental consent for an abortion but not married minors
in the absence of a finding of increased maturity); Buss, supra note 22, at 829 (providing minor
parents with equal rights as adult parents may seriously harm the minor parent as she is not
mature enough to handle the responsibility).
62. See Hanisco, supra note 5, at 932 (stating what the courts and legislatures have done is
simply react to teen problems and "have not actually carved out these consent exceptions be-
cause they believe minors have a right to privacy or self-determination.").
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nies that status.63 Even though the teen mom may be making medical
decisions for her own child, she may not be able to make medical deci-
sions for herself, even those with lesser consequences. 64 If compe-
tence were the guiding principle, her ability to decide for her daughter
would encompass the ability to decide for herself.65 Her maternal sta-
tus-based essentially on her ability to get pregnant and give birth-
has little, if anything, to do with competence.
C. Condition/Disease
Like the status exception, the condition/disease exception to the pa-
rental consent rule is not based on a competence rationale. Instead,
the basic rationale of this type of exception is that the cost of a minor
failing to seek treatment is greater than the state's desire to involve
parents in their child's health care decision-making. 66 Therefore,
many states allow a minor to consent to medical treatment relating to
venereal disease, 67 mental health treatment, 68 or sexual abuse.69 Al-
though this condition/disease exception serves public policy well be-
cause it encourages teens to seek needed medical treatment without
having to speak to their parents about it, the exception does not pro-
vide a basis for adopting a mature minor doctrine that is actually
based on maturity.
63. See JAMES M. MORRISSEY EI" AL., CONSENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE
OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS: A LFGAL GUIDE 41 (1986) (citing Meyer, Yoder, Santosky
and Pierce, the authors recognize that even if a state does not have an actual "enabling statute,"
a minor parent is going to have the same "fundamental right as against all others to the custody
and control of their offspring"). See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality
opinion) (reaffirming constitutional protection for parental rights).
64. See supra note 60 (referring to statutes that permit decisions for children, but not teen
moms themselves).
65. See Ehrlich, Reproductive Fairness, supra note 23, at 20-21 (expressing concern that we
have such a disparate approach with teen moms, particularly as to making medical decisions for
themselves and their children).
66. See Scott, supra note 4, at 568. By not requiring children to obtain parental consent prior
to seeking treatment, it not only will encourage them to get help but also serve society's interests
because the likelihood of untreated conditions, such as mental illness and sexually transmitted
diseases, will be reduced. Id. Although children may not have the same level of maturity as
adults in these situations, they need to be protected from the potential harm that could result
from telling their parents. Id.
67. See statutes cited in Hanisco, supra note 5, at n. 8; Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy, supra
note 2, at n. 197; Rosato, Life-Sustaining Treatment, supra 4, at n.109; and Scott, supra note 4, at
n. 80.
68. See statutes cited in Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy, supra note 2, at n. 285; Rosato, Life-
Sustaining Treatment, supra note 4, at n.1 11; and Scott, supra note 4, at n. 80.
69. See statutes cited in Rosato, Life-Sustaining Treatment, supra note 4, at n. 112; and Scott,
supra note 4, at n. 80.
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D. Reluctance to Adopt a "True" Mature Minor Doctrine
Efforts to adopt a true mature minor doctrine have been limited. A
true mature minor doctrine would permit adolescents who possess the
requisite capacity to make health care decisions on their own. 70 Such
a doctrine could be reflected in a bright-line rule (assuming that mi-
nors of a particular age are deemed competent) 71 or in an individual-
ized determination of competence by a health care provider or a
judicial officer.
72
Even for states that have passed these kinds of mature minor stat-
utes, the scope of the statutes may be more limited than they appear.
For example, the statute may extend to consent to treatment, but not
for refusal of treatment.7 3 From a competence perspective, this dis-
tinction between consent and refusal is not a meaningful one: the abil-
ity to consent should encompass the ability to refuse, as it does for
adults.74 Limiting the doctrine in this manner avoids the hard ques-
tions (like what to do when a minor refuses treatment and the parent
consents) and limits the development of a principled approach.
A few courts, acknowledging the absence of recognition for mature
minors in statutes, have adopted a common law doctrine to accom-
70. On this point, I am neither as cynical as Professor Hartman nor as optimistic as Professor
Scott. Professor Hartman questions whether one could call the limited recognition of the mature
minor doctrine a doctrine at all. See Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy, supra note 2, at 1311-17. 1
think that some of the thoughtful decisions by appellate courts do qualify as an emerging doc-
trine. See discussion infra pp. 780-782. Professor Scott gives the impression that the mature
minor doctrine in the health care area is well-established and evolving. See Scott, supra note 4, at
566-68. A few states did recognize the mature minor early on, but this limited recognition failed
to develop. Instead, only the narrow exceptions proliferated.
71. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-280 (Law. Co-op. 2000) (creating a bright-line rule for minors
that are aged sixteen or older to consent to medical treatment); see also Scott, supra note 4, at
598 n.38 (referring to statutes where legislatures have used a bright-line rule to recognize the
maturity of adolescents as a group).
72. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-602(7) (Michie 2000) (allowing unemancipated minors to
consent to medical treatment if they are of sufficient intelligence to understand and appreciate
the consequences of their decision); IDAHO CODE § 39-4302 (Michie 2000) (stating that any per-
son of competent intelligence to comprehend the nature and the significant risks posed by the
medical treatment is competent to consent on his own behalf); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 129.030
(2) (Michie 2001)(permitting a minor that understands the purpose of the examination and treat-
ment and its probable outcome to consent to the medical treatment, but provider must make
efforts to seek minor's consent to communicate with parents in most instances); cf. ALASKA
STAT. § 25.20.025(2) (Michie 2000) (allowing a minor to consent to medical treatment without
parental consent where the minor is first counseled before such treatment).
73. See Op. La. Atty Gen. No. 88-232, 2 (1988) (explaining that the language of the Louisiana
statute [Section 40:1095] does not extend to minors the right to refuse treatment). See generally
Jan Costello, IfI Can Say Yes, Why Can't I Say No?, in CHILD, PARENT & STATE 490 (1994)
(reviewing minor consent and refusal under existing law).
74. See Rosato, Life-Sustaining Treatment, supra note 4, at 15-16.
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plish that result.75 Other courts presented with the issue have de-
clined to adopt a mature minor doctrine altogether or have
determined that the minor patient in the case was not sufficiently
mature.
76
Even the decisions that have adopted the mature minor doctrine
may not be considered precedent for treating mature minors as adults
for all health care decisions. For example, some cases have adopted
the mature minor doctrine in the context of a minor's (or her repre-
sentative's) ability to sue for damages caused by the tortious conduct
of a health care provider. 77 It is unclear, however, whether the doc-
trine would be extended to different contexts-such as when a minor
is refusing life-sustaining treatment and death could result. Here, the
state's interest in preserving life may be a significant countervailing
consideration. 78
Moreover, at least one court has suggested that its recognition of a
mature minor's decision depends at least in part on whether the par-
ents agree with the minor's decision. In In re E.G. 79 for example, the
Supreme Court of Illinois upheld a trial court's determination that a
seventeen-year-old Jehovah's Witness was mature enough to refuse a
75. See, e.g., Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827, 837, 838 (W. Va. 1992)
(remanding the case to determine whether the minor had the capacity to refuse life-sustaining
treatment); In re Chad Eric Swan, 569 A.2d 1202 (Me. 1990) (respecting the minor's wishes to
refuse artificial life-support); In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (II. 1990) (holding that the minor was
mature enough to exercise her First Amendment right of freedom of religion in refusing blood
transfusions); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 748 (Tenn. 1987) (holding that the court
should consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether a seventeen-year-old girl
had the capacity to assent to medical treatment); cf. In re Rena, 705 N.E.2d 1155, 1157 (Mass.
1999) (holding that a determination of minor's maturity must be assessed in deciding whether a
minor has the capacity to make an informed decision to refuse a blood transfusion because of
religious convictions).
76. See Commonwealth v. Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151, 1155 (Pa. 2000) (finding no legislative intent
to create an exception for minors who have the capacity to consent or refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment); In the Matter of Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 147 Misc. 2d 724 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1990) (finding the seventeen year old minor insufficiently mature to understand the conse-
quences of refusing a blood transfusion because of religious convictions); O.G. v. Baum, 790
S.W.2d 839, 841 (Tex. 1990) (refusing to consider the maturity of a minor to refuse blood transfu-
sion where the minor offered no testimony for the court to evaluate the minor's capacity to
understand the consequences of such a decision); see also Novak v. Cobb-Kennestone Hosp.
Auth., 849 F. Supp. 1559, 1575 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (upholding the statutory intent to limit the right
to refuse medical treatment to persons eighteen years or older).
77. See Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 751 (Tenn. 1987); Belcher, 422 S.E.2d 827.
78. Although the state's interest may not be a reason to make a different finding regarding
competence, it may affect the ultimate balance of interests. See infra notes 175-176 and accom-
panying text.
79. 549 N.E.2d 322 (I11. 1989). For critical analyses of the E.G decision, see Rosato, Life-
Sustaining Treatment, supra note 4, at 43-45; Rosato, Bioethics, supra note 20, at 14-15; Hartman,
Adolescent Autonomy, supra note 2, at 1313-14.
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blood transfusion as part of her cancer treatment. 80 In its opinion, the
court implicitly limited the reach of the mature minor doctrine by con-
cluding that the parents' failure to agree with the minor could justify
limiting the minor's autonomy.8 1
If the court had been committed to respecting the autonomy of ma-
ture minors, it would not have limited the doctrine in this manner.
The mature minor doctrine should not be so fragile that it depends on
whether the parent agrees or disagrees with the child. If a minor is
determined to be competent enough to make adult decisions, then the
disagreement of a third person, even if it is the parent, should not be
sufficiently compelling to override the young person's right of auton-
omy.8 2 Under this theory, the minor fills the shoes of the adult and
should be able to walk in them.
It appears that so far only one court has committed itself to the
mature minor doctrine when the minor is refusing life-sustaining treat-
ment. In In re Chad Eric Swan,83 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine permitted removal of Chad's nutrition and hydration-even
though it meant that he would die.84 The court made it clear that its
decision was based on Chad's previously held beliefs, not the court's
or the parents' view of what was best for him.85 Before his accident
(and while he was a minor), Chad expressed his wishes not to be sus-
tained in a persistent vegetative state. The court determined that his
wishes should be followed.86 However, Chad's case was an easy one
in that he was seventeen when he expressed his views, his views were
clearly expressed, his parents held the same views, and his physical
condition was a persistent vegetative state with no hope of improve-
ment.87 In light of these facts, the precedential value of this case is
80. 549 N.E.2d at 328.
81. Id.
82. See Rosato, Bioethics, supra note 20, at 49-54; see also Rosato, Life-Sustaining Treatment,
supra note 4, at 73-81 (discussing the interests of parents in making medical decisions for their
children).
83. 562 A.2d 1202 (Me. 1990). For other analyses of the Chad Eric Swan case, see Rosato,
Life-Sustaining Treatment, supra note 4, at 40-43; Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy, supra note 2,
at 1326-28; Hanisco, supra note 5, at 915-16; Robert Stenger, Exclusive or Concurrent Compe-
tence to Make Medical Decisions for Adolescents in the United States and United Kingdom, 14
J.L. & HEALTH 209, 215 (1999/2000).
84. 569 A.2d at 1206.
85. Id. at 1205, 1206.
86. Id. at 1206.
87. In the context of parent decision-making for a child in a persistent vegetative state, the
courts have been more deferential to parents, even though it means that the child probably will




probably limited. Therefore, a stronger basis for a mature minor doc-
trine is needed to sustain it.
E. Making the Case for Mature Minors
A number of commentators have criticized the existing presump-
tion of incapacity, particularly in the health care context.88 Consider-
ing the fact that at least some adolescents achieve the requisite
capacity before they reach the age of maturity,8 9 presuming incapacity
for all adolescents seems unjustified. Professor Rhonda Gay Hartman
has argued quite persuasively that this approach has led to a "discor-
dant" legal approach to adolescent decision-making ability.90 The ap-
proach represents a stagnant enclave in law and policy, "suffering...
from ...serial neglect." Professor Hartman believes that this ap-
proach ends up harming adolescents, and the larger society, because it
stunts the minors' "life-long development of decision-making abil-
ity." 9' In its place, she proposes an adolescent autonomy model,
based on existing developmental literature, that respects the actual ca-
pabilities of young persons. 92
Although I agree with Professor Hartman that the existing doctrine
inadequately reflects the realities of adolescents' capabilities, an ado-
lescent autonomy model cannot completely remedy the problems with
the existing doctrine. Thus far, the developmental literature does not
support the conclusion that all older minors deserve deference. 93 For
that reason, I propose that the existing knowledge on competence be
patched together with other relevant perspectives to create a new doc-
trinal quilt of adolescent empowerment.
88. See Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy, supra note 2, at 1266 (there is a dearth of definitive
legal guidelines other than the age-old formality that anyone under 18 years of age is presumed
to lack decisional authority, as if on one's 18th birthday an enormous epiphany occurs); see also
Hanisco, supra note 5, at 900, 923 (by relying on the traditional dependency doctrine, the best
interests of the child are ignored); Susan Hawkins, Note, Protecting the Rights and Interests of
Competent Minors in Litigated Medical Treatment Disputes, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075, 2118
(1996) (within the informed consent context, empirical research fails to show that children have
as diminished capacity as the legal community once believed); Mlyniec, supra note 32, at 1881 (in
general, little research exists that there is significant difference in the decision-making ability of
older adolescents as compared to adults).
89. See discussion infra notes 142-169 and accompanying text.
90. See Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy, supra note 2, at 1287. Others agree. See supra note
4 and accompanying text.
91. Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy, supra note 2, at 1269.
92. Id. at 1358-61. In her most recent article, Professor Hartman builds on her initial work by
examining physician's attitudes and practices regarding adolescent patients. See Hartman, Phy-
sician Perceptions, supra note 61, at 87-134.
93. See infra notes 95-116 and accompanying text.
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Formulation of this proposal involves examining the insights offered
by the patches of developmental theory and bioethics, and setting
forth the guidance they have to offer. Properly stitched together, they
can bring needed coherence and realism into the existing doctrine.
III. CREATING A MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE: "KIDs RULE"
"[W]e swim in a sea of empirical ignorance and uncertainty about
the consequences of regulating youth.
'94
The existing legal doctrine is still in need of some principled gui-
dance. But from where can such guidance come, which will allow the
doctrine to become more reality-based and respectful of a young per-
son's rights? This section articulates a number of the lessons that can
be learned from the disciplines of developmental psychology and
bioethics. These lessons form the basis for an incremental transforma-
tion of existing law.
A. Learning from Developmental Psychology
As discussed in the previous section, the existing law on health care
decision-making does not reflect the realities of families and chil-
dren. 95 Specifically, the existing law fails to take into account a devel-
opmental perspective that "examines the soundness of age-based legal
policies in light of scientific research and theory on psychological de-
velopment. ' 96 The social policy reflected in the current approach
"may be practical or politically expedient, but ...makes no sense
from the vantage point of developmental psychology.
'97
The findings of developmental psychology provide useful guidance
that ultimately should inform the law.98 In the past, however, such
findings generally have been ignored by the courts, including the
94. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORL1D OF ADOLESCENCE 67 (1982).
95. See supra discussion notes 14-93 and accompanying text.
96. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, A Developmental Perspective on Serious Juve-
nile Crime: When Should Juveniles be Treated as Adults?, 63 FED. PROBAT ION 52, 52 (1999)
[hereinafter Steinberg & Cauffman, A Developmental Perspective]; see also Laurence Steinberg
& Elizabeth Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom: A Developmental Perspective on the
Adjudication of Youthful Offenders, 6 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 389, 390 (1999) [hereinafter Stein-
berg & Cauffman, Elephant in the Courtroom] (stating developmental psychology informs the
discussion of "moral, political, and practical questions").
97. See Steinberg & Cauffman, Elephant in the Courtroom, supra note 96, at 416 (commenting
on the importance of developmental psychology to inform social policy in the context of juvenile
justice).
98. Id. at 397; see also Buss, supra note 9, at 919-20; Jennifer L. Woolard et al., Theoretical and
Methodological Issues in Studying Children's Capacities in Legal Contexts, 20 LAW & HUM. BEH.
219, 225-26 (1996).
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United States Supreme Court. 99 For example, in Parham v. J.R.,1°°
the Court simply presumed minors' incompetence without any empiri-
cal support. 10 This unjustified presumption generally has been fol-
lowed by courts in the health care context. 1
2
However, the opposite presumption has emerged in the context of
juvenile justice. Older adolescents are presumed to have the requisite
competence to be held criminally responsible and to stand trial as
adults. 1t 3 Simply stated, if the minor can "do the [adult] crime," he
can "do the [adult] time."
'' 04
But which of these presumptions is justified? The answer is neither
when we stop to consider findings as to the minor's competence and
moral development. In the health care context, these findings should
lead to a more contextual determination based on the lessons that can
be learned from the existing competence and moral development
literature.
1. Competence
The presumption of incompetence in health care decision-making
has been questioned by developmental psychologists over the last
twenty years. 0 5 Early studies concluded that adolescents aged four-
99. See Bersoff & Glass, supra note 9, at 291-93, 301-02 (using case examples "of the 'puzzling
disjunction' between the world depicted through the lens of empirical social science and the
world as it is perceived by the Supreme Court"); see also Donald N. Bersoff, Autonomy for
Vulnerable Populations: The Supreme Court's Reckless Disregard for Self-Determination and So-
cial Science, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1569, 1597 (1992) ("Courts cite the results of psychological re-
search when they believe it will enhance the elegance of their opinions, . . . but empiricism is
readily discarded when more traditional legally acceptable bases for decision-making are availa-
ble."); Richard E. Redding, How Common-Sense Psychology Can Inform the Law and Psycho-
logical Research, 5 U. Ci. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 107, 114 (1998) ("IT]he law ignores social
science when social science fails to consider adequately the common-sense psychology inherent
in law."); accord Scott, supra note 4, at 560 n.56 (providing case examples of the United States
Supreme Court choosing to ignore developmentally-based legal arguments).
100. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
101. See Bersoff & Glass, supra note 9, at 279; see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
824-25 (1988) (choosing to base its decision that a minor is not competent to receive the death
penalty on the fact that "legislation is consistent with the experience of mankind, as well as the
long history of our law, that the normal 15-year-old is not prepared to assume the full responsi-
bilities of an adult" rather than on specific findings of developmental psychology) (citation
omitted).
102. See supra notes 4-7 and acompanying text.
103. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
104. See Jon Sorenson, Pataki Plan on Juvenile Offenders Includes Longer Sentences in Adult
Jails, BUFF. NEWS, Dec. 10, 1995, at A16 (quoting New York's Governor George Pataki as saying
"Adult crime should mean adult time.").
105. See L.A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents
to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1596 (1982) (finding that empirical
results do not support policies based on a presumption of incompetence in adolescence treat-
2002] LET'S GET REAL
teen and above possess the requisite understanding and reasoning to
make health care decisions: their choices and decision-making
processes resemble those of young adults. 10 6 The researchers ex-
amined various indicia of competence, including evidence of choice, a
reasonable outcome, rational reasons for the choice, and understand-
ing.107 These studies continue to be cited to support the abandonment
of the incompetence presumption,' 08 although they have done little to
change the law in this area." 9
The studies have been criticized by other scholars on a number of
grounds. Some critiques have been based on methodological limita-
tions, such as the researchers' use of hypotheticals and white, middle-
class subjects.' 0 Others have questioned how these earlier studies de-
fined competence. Because the early studies defined competence nar-
ment decision-making); see also Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in
Adolescents' Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 129, 130 (1992) (finding no evidence to support the long-standing presumption of incom-
petence below age of eighteen).
106. See, e.g., Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 105, at 1593-96 (noting 14 and above);
Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors' Consent to Treatment: A Development Perspective,
PROF. PSYCHOL., Aug. 1978, at 412, 416-24 (15 and above).
These findings were affirmed in later studies on health care decision-making in general. See
David G. Scherer & N. Dickon Reppucci, Adolescents' Capacities to Provide Voluntary Informed
Consent, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 123 (1988) (adolescents 14-15 years old are more likely to
resist parental influence when the consequences of a health care decision has serious implica-
tions for their health ): David G. Scherer, The Capacities of Minors to Exercise Voluntariness in
Medical Treatment Decisions, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 431, 440-46, 445 (1991) (finding that
although adolescents were more vulnerable to parental influence than younger adults in making
treatment decisions, "older adolescents should not be excluded from making treatment decisions
on the presumption that they lack the requisite capacities for volition.").
They also were affirmed specifically in the abortion context. See, e.g., Britner et al., supra note
37, at 56-57 (reviewing developmental studies that found that adolescents ages fourteen and
older are equal to adults in their decision-making competency).
107. See Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 105, at 1595-97; see also Grisso & Vierling, supra
note 106, at 416-23 (developing concepts of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary consent).
108. See, e.g., Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy, supra note 2, at 1318 n.235; Mlyniec, supra
note 32, at 1881, n.38; Robert F. Weir & Charles Peters, Affirming the Decisions Adolescents
Make About Life and Death, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 29, 31 (Nov. - Dec. 1997); Bersoff &
Glass, supra note 9, at 296 n.129.
109. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
110. Even critics of the studies do not dispute their actual findings. See, e.g., Elizabeth
Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective Influences on Adolescent Decision
Making, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1763, 1768-70 (1995) [hereinafter Cauffman & Steinberg, Affective
Influences]; Thomas Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 3, 12, 15 (1997) [hereinafter Grisso, Competence]; Thomas Grisso, Society's
Retributive Response to Juvenile Violence: A Developmental Perspective, 20 LAw & HuM. BEHAV.
229, 233 (1996) [hereinafter Grisso, Retributive Response]; Scott, supra note 4, at 567 n.77; Eliza-
beth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 221, 224-26 (1995); Elizabeth Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence, 88
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 158-60 (1997).
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rowly through the components of understanding and reason, they
overlooked the psychosocial factors that distinguish adolescents from
adults.'" These psychosocial factors include the adolescents' con-
formity and compliance in relation to peers and parents," 12 their atti-
tude toward and perception of risk,'" 3 and temporal perspective.
1 4
For example, later studies showed that adolescents are more subject to
peer influences, they weigh risks differently than adults, and they fo-
cus on short-term consequences. Greater impulsiveness and moodi-
ness may also limit adolescents' judgment." 15 Finally, the tremendous
variability among adolescents makes generalizations as to this popula-
tion even more difficult than for adults."16 For these reasons, it is im-
portant to determine what conclusions (if any) can be drawn about
adolescent decision-makers in the juvenile justice context and whether
those conclusions are equally applicable in the health care decision-
making context.
a. Lessons from the Juvenile Justice Context
The body of research that has emerged over the last decade focuses
on the psychosocial factors that distinguish adolescents' and adults'
decision-making ability. These studies have been conducted in the ju-
venile justice context where at least three different kinds of compe-
tence can be measured: whether the youth is sufficiently culpable to
111. See Scott, supra note 110, at 226-29; Grisso, Retributive Response, supra note 110, at 233-
35: Richard E. Redding, Juveniles Transferred to Criminal Court: Legal Reform Proposals Based
on Social Science Research, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 709, 724-30.
112. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 110, at 160-61. This factor has been further reflected in
social comparison, id. at 162; conformity, Scott et al., supra note 110, at 230; and complacency,
Redding, supra note 11l, at 726-27.
113. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 110, at 161, 163.
114. Id. at 161, 164; see also Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment
in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
249, 252 (1996) [hereinafter Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment] (psychosocial charac-
teristics divided into responsibility, perspective, and temperance).
115. See Grisso, Competence, supra note 110, at 18 (noting, "to the extent that moodiness...
is more characteristic of adolescents than adults . . . greater inconsistency in problem-solving
effectiveness would be expected among adolescents"); Redding, supra note 111, at 729 (noting,
"I R]esearch on sensation seeking, impulsivity, moodiness, and pubertal hormones converges to
suggest that adolescents are moodier and have poorer impulse control than adults."); Steinberg
& Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment, supra note 114, at 261-62 (noting, "[G]iven that adolescents'
moods are more volatile than adults', one reasonable hypothesis is that adolescents' judgment is
less consistent than that of adults.").
116. See Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychology Goes to
Court, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 9, 24 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (stating,
"This intraindividual variability makes it difficult, if not impossible, to make generalizations
about an adolescent's average level of maturity on the basis of any one indicator alone."). See
also Steinberg & Cauffman, A Developmental Perspective, supra note 96, at 57 (stating, "variabil-
ity among adolescents of a given chronological age is the rule, not the exception.").
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account for his criminal conduct; whether the youth is competent to
stand trial; and whether the youth would be amenable to treatment.'
17
The tentative conclusion of these studies seems to be that the juve-
nile justice law that currently embodies a presumption of competence
is not reflective of adolescent development, particularly as it applies to
younger adolescents.11 8 Consequently, automatically trying younger
adolescents as adults is unsupported by the existing literature."19
The studies seem less clear as to how the law should treat older
adolescents, 120 although a few choices are possible. A bright-line test
could be adopted that would allow minors over a particular age to be
tried as adults. This approach would be based on the assumption that
older adolescents are competent enough to be held accountable for
their acts and to stand trial, and would be less amenable to treatment.
Alternatively, a case-by-case approach could be adopted, which would
require an individualized determination to ascertain whether a partic-
ular minor was mature enough to be punished or to stand trial.
The trend so far is in the direction of requiring an individualized
determination of competence, even for older adolescents. The well-
respected work of Professors Elizabeth Cauffman and Laurence
Steinberg is illustrative. Although their work consistently favored an
individualized determination for younger adolescents, the earlier stud-
ies had distinguished between adolescents aged seventeen and older,
and those aged sixteen and younger.' 21 Most of the oldest group
probably possessed the capacity to be tried as adults.
117. See Steinberg & Schwartz, supra note 116, at 19.
118. Although there is no consensus as to what constitutes a "younger adolescent," I generally
will use that reference for a teenager younger than fourteen years. Cf. Weithorn & Campbell,
supra note 105 at 1590-91, 1595-96 (comparing 9, 14, and 18 year olds); David G. Scherer, The
Capacities of Minors to Exercise Voluntariness in Medical Treatment Decisions, 15 LAW &
HUMAN BEH. 431 (1991) (noting that 14 and 15 year-olds tested as adolescents).
119. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 110, at 188-89.
120. Id. at 181-89; see also Steinberg & Cauffman, Elephant in the Courtroom, supra note 96,
at 413-15. 1 consider older adolescents those who are aged sixteen and older, although Steinberg
and Cauffman seem to make the cut-off at seventeen. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
121. See Cauffman & Steinberg, Affective Influences, supra note 110, at 1789 (concluding ten-
tatively that there are important psychosocial differences between early adolescents (under the
age of seventeen) and adults); Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment, supra note 114, at
268 (encouraging empirical research involving individuals sixteen and younger versus those sev-
enteen and older in order to justify their hypothesis of maturity differences between the two);
Steinberg & Cauffman, A Developmental Perspective, supra note 96, at 57 (separating individuals
into three categories: juveniles (under the age of thirteen) who should not be adjudicated in
adult court; adults (over the age of seventeen) who should; and youths (between the ages of




More recently, however, Professors Cauffman and Steinberg seem
to question the appropriateness of automatically transferring even the
oldest adolescents to adult court. Finding that significant develop-
ment in psychosocial characteristics takes place during older adoles-
cence,12 2 the authors suggest that a more individualized approach is
preferable. Other scholars also seem to favor this approach.
123
Although the individualized approach seems to be the favored ap-
proach at this time, it is still based on tentative findings. 12 4 Even the
authors of these studies admit that more research must be conducted
to determine, from a developmental perspective, when adolescents
who commit crimes deserve to be tried as adults or as juveniles.
b. Lessons for Adolescent Health Care Decision-Making
Even if an individualized determination were favored in the juve-
nile justice context, it does not necessarily mean that the same ap-
proach should be adopted in the health care decision-making context.
The degree of competence required here is qualitatively different and,
even more significantly, the balance of interests in the health care con-
text weighs in favor of giving adolescents greater decision-making
power than they currently have.
The first reason why the psychological findings in the juvenile jus-
tice context may not be useful in the health care context is because the
measure of competence is qualitatively different. 125 Some compe-
tence criteria do overlap. For example, in both contexts, the minor
must possess what has been termed "decisional competence," "the ca-
pacity to engage in cognitive and judgment processes in making im-
portant decisions that defendants must make for themselves .... ,126
The psychosocial factors described above are relevant to evaluate
judgment processes. 127 These aspects of decisional competence are
122. See Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (lm)maturity of Judgment in Adoles-
cence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741, 750-56
(2000) [hereinafter Cauffman & Steinberg, Inmaturity].
123. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 4, at 589-97; see also Redding, supra note 111, at 743-63;
Grisso, Competence, supra note 110, at 22 (both proposing use of presumptions and individual-
ized determinations).
124. See Cauffman & Steinberg, Immaturity, supra note 122, at 757-58; cf. Britner et al., supra
note 37, at 47-54 (outlining additional research necessary to determine competence in medical
treatment setting).
125. See generally Britner et al., supra note 37, at 40, 50 (noting difficulties of transferring
competence findings between contexts and concluding that contextually specific competence
must be ascertained).
126. See Thomas Grisso, What We Know About Youths' Capacities as Trial Defendants, in
Your ON TRIAL, supra note 116, at 143.
127. See discussion supra notes 112-116 and accompanying text.
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particularly important in determining whether the youth is culpable
and amenable to treatment. For example, the minor may differ from
an adult in his limited ability to understand the long-term conse-
quences of his acts, may not give the appropriate weight to certain
risks posed by his conduct, and may not be able to resist peer pressure
to engage in wrongful conduct. 128
Similar components make up the competence necessary for health
care decisions. Although there is no consensus as to these compo-
nents, some appear to be well established: the presence or absence of
a decision; a reasonable outcome; a reasonable (rational) decision-
making process; and understanding. 129 Psychosocial factors are rele-
vant here, as they are in the juvenile justice context. For example, the
way that adolescents focus on short-term consequences may cause
them to reject treatments for reasons such as their effects on physical
appearance. 130 And adolescents' diminished ability to comply may re-
duce their ability to follow prescribed treatment regimens. 13'
Considering the components together, however, the competence re-
quired for making decisions in these contexts is not identical. Gener-
alizations are therefore difficult to make. This is particularly true
when trying to compare health care decisional competence with adju-
dicative competence, which is the competence of a juvenile to stand
trial. To achieve adjudicative competence, the minor must understand
the trial process and be able to participate in his defense with his at-
torney.132 In addition, he must know "not only that [he] has certain
rights, but also what a right is."'1 33 The explicit rights recognition is
not a prerequisite to being able to consent to or refuse medical treat-
ment. Rather, a careful assessment of the risks/benefits of treatment
is necessary, whether the treatment involves treating an infection with
antibiotics or cancer with chemotherapy. 34
128. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 110, at 160-64.
129. These criteria are derived from the taxonomy articulated in 1977 by Roth, Meisel, and
Lidz and has been widely used by others. See Samantha Weyrauch, Comment, Decision Making
for Incompetent Patients: Who Decides and By What Standards?, 35 TULSA L.J. 765, 773-77
(2000); accord Britner et al., supra note 37, at 40-42.
130. Cf Rosato, Life-Sustaining Treatment, supra note 4, at 61 (dying adolescents may be
overly concerned with physical appearance). See generally Britner et al., supra note 37, at 48
(adolescents may be more vulnerable where body image is involved).
131. Cf. Rosato, Life-Sustaining Treatment, supra note 4, at 61-62 & n.255 (discussing difficul-
ties of complying with AIDS treatment regimens, which may require higher degree of
competence).
132. See Grisso, supra note 126, at 142-45.
133. Id. at 143.
134. The maturity determination has been made in the context of minor and major medical
interventions. See, e.g., Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 22 S.E.2d 827 (W.Va. 1992) (rein-
tubation/resuscitation); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987) (osteopathic manipu-
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As such, the individualized approach that appears to be favored for
determining whether juveniles should be tried as adults may not be
the right approach for determining when older adolescents should be
able to make health care decisions on their own. 135 Therefore, the
findings of the older studies still provide the best evidence that older
adolescents (by age sixteen and perhaps earlier) are mature enough to
make health care decisions on their own.
136
Even if the competence in both contexts encompassed similar crite-
ria, it does not necessarily mean that the individualized approach
should be favored here. Unlike the juvenile justice context, the bal-
ance of interests weighs much more favorably toward giving older ad-
olescents the ability to make their own health care decisions. First of
all, the state's interests in incapacitating youthful offenders and deter-
ring wrongful behavior 37 that are important when dealing with crimi-
nal behavior are not implicated in the health care context. Rather, the
state's interests are infringed primarily when the minor's refusal of
needed treatment would cause her serious bodily harm or death.' 3
8
Not only are the state's interests lower here, but the interest in nur-
turing adolescent autonomy is much stronger than in the juvenile jus-
tice context. Allowing adolescents to make health care decisions is
beneficial because it is likely to improve their self-esteem and sense of
control in the short-term, and make them better decision-makers and
citizens in the long-term.
39
Moreover, the failure to respect adolescents' burgeoning autonomy
is likely to cause harm to their personhood, especially when the health
care decision involves the exercise of moral judgment. 40 If adoles-
cents cannot make these decisions for themselves, they may be forced
to live a life that they have not chosen and certain future opportuni-
ties may be foreclosed to them permanently.'
4'
lation of neck, spine, and legs); Younts v. Saint Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d
330 (Kan. 1970) (surgical repair of fingertip).
135. In interpreting the existing findings, researchers, policy-makers, and judges must be care-
ful not to reach conclusions too quickly regarding what appears to be the right result. What may
be a desirable result in the juvenile justice context, trying juveniles in family court, may result in
disempowerment in another context.
136. See discussion supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
137. See generally Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legis-
lative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987).
138. See Rosato, Life-Sustaining Treatment, supra note 4, at 68-72, 83-87.
139. See discussion infra notes 156-160 and accompanying text.
14(0. See generally discussion infra notes 186-223 and accompanying text.
141. See Joel Feinberg, The Child's Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN'S




Consequently, we must look beyond the competence literature for
needed guidance on how the law can encourage autonomy in adoles-
cent decision-makers. Categorically preventing minors from making
health care decisions before the age of majority-as the law currently
provides-is not the way to accomplish that objective. Moral devel-
opment theory offers some important lessons.
2. Moral Development Theory
During adolescence, the minor has a number of important tasks.
Among the most important are development of one's identity and the
skills and values necessary to become a productive citizen in a demo-
cratic society. 142 The role of parents and the state should be to en-
courage independent decision-making during adolescence to help
ensure that the minor will grow into a capable adult. 143 This role is
particularly important when it comes to encouraging moral develop-
ment, where the child is faced with decisions in which he must choose
among competing values.
144
Such value-laden choices are implicit in many medical decisions that
involve more than determining whether to prescribe an antibiotic for
a bad case of strep throat or to put a cast on a broken bone. For
example, in the abortion context, the minor must consider not only
her views about when life begins, 145 but also about how she would like
to live her life. Will she choose life as a mother, with all its corre-
sponding responsibilities, or life as a (relatively) carefree teenager? 146
In the life-sustaining treatment context, the minor must think deeply
about sustaining a certain quality of life versus valuing life for its own
sake. 147 When a minor acts as a donor (donating an organ or blood
marrow to a sibling) or as a research subject in a clinical trial, the
142. See Emily Buss, The Adolescent's Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control Between
Parent and State, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1253, 1288, 1359-60 (2000).
143. See id. at 1250-51; cf. Richard L. Roe. Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools as
Conceptual Development, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1271, 1313-15 (1991) (following work of Amy Gut-
mann, who believes the central purpose of public education is to establish learning processes that
prepare young people for "civic participation and deliberation within a democratic govern-
ment."); LEVESQUE, supra note 4, at 337 (the law should ensure the "development of democratic
citizens"). See generally Gary B. Melton, Decision Making by Children, in CHILDREN'S COMPE-
TENCE TO CONSENT (1983).
144. See JOSEPH REIMER ET AL., PROMOTING MORAL GROWTH: FROM PIAGET TO KOHLBERG
45-48 (1983). Kohlberg's work addresses the question of which values to follow in a particular
situation.
145. See ZIMRING, supra note 94, at 66. See generally RONALD M. DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMIN-
ION 3-24 (1993) (stating that abortion addresses fundamental moral questions).
146. The stark differences between these two roles are illuminated infra notes 194-195 and
accompanying text.
147. See Rosato, Life-Sustaining Treatment, supra note 4, at 12-16.
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minor's altruistic tendencies are an integral part of her decision. 148 All
of these difficult choices shape a minor's identity and reflect her
values.
However, the existing law does not permit adolescents to make
these decisions for themselves. Instead, the law embodies the view
that "parents know best" and should make all health care decisions,
from the most insignificant to the most value-laden. 149 This approach
is not supported by the literature on moral development, which favors
respecting the child's autonomy absent a compelling, countervailing
reason.
Moral development progresses through a number of stages during
childhood. According to psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, 150 moral
development evolves sequentially through six separate stages.' 5' With
each stage, the child becomes less self-centered and more concerned
with the larger society and its expectations.
52
Although Kohlberg posits that the sequence of these stages cannot
be altered, children may advance more quickly when provided with
more morality-based education and more decision-making opportuni-
ties prior to adulthood. 53 Take altruism for example. Altruism,
which has been defined as "behavior carried out to benefit another
without anticipation of rewards from external sources,"' 54 is a desira-
ble trait that all adults should possess. But the trait does not just ap-
pear magically at the age of eighteen. Its development needs to be
nurtured during childhood through adult role modeling, moral educa-
tion, and experiences in acting altruistically towards others.
55
148. See discussion infra notes 209-216 and accompanying text.
149. See discussion supra notes 14-87 and accompanying text.
150. Professor Kohlberg's theories on moral development are still followed, although over
time they have been criticized and their relevance narrowed. See DAVID MOSHMAN, CHILDREN,
EIUCATION AND THE FIRsT AMENDMEN'r 83-85 (1989); NANCY EISENBERG & PAUL H. MUSSEN,
THE RooTs OF PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN 119-24 (1989).
151. See Beschle, supra note 4, at 99 (citing Professor Kohlberg).
152. These stages are identified as follows: heteronomous morality; individualism, instrumen-
tal purpose, and exchange; mutual interpersonal expectations, relationships, and interpersonal
conformity; social system and conscience; social contract or utility and individual rights; and
universal ethical principles. See charts reprinted in EISENBERG & MUSsEN, supra note 150, at
121-22; REIMER, supra note 144, at 58-61; see also MOSHMAN, supra note 150, at 79-82 (brief
overview of Kohlberg stages). Most persons do not achieve the highest (sixth) stage. See
MOSHMAN, supra note 150, at 82.
153. See LEVESQUE, supra note 4, at 344; MOSHMAN, supra note 150, at 86-88; Melton, supra
note 143, at 27-28.
154. See MORTON HUNT, THE COMPASSIONATE BEAST 18 (1990) (citing mainstream
definition).
155. Id. at 109-15, 209-12, 212-19; EISENBERG & MUSSEN, supra note 150, at chs. 6, 7, and 11.
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Providing more opportunities for independent decision-making is
beneficial for a number of reasons. Individually, greater autonomy
leads to improved self-esteem and the reduction of dependency on
adults. 156 Societally, greater autonomy leads to better outcomes and
adults who are better prepared to meet the responsibilities of citizen-
ship. 157 To achieve these benefits, the law should "foster dynamic self-
determination" and "allow for adolescent participation,"' 158 which in-
cludes allowing adolescents to make decisions on their own.159 Other-
wise, adolescents might be denied their essential personhood.
160
The learner's permit approach articulated by Professor Frank Zimr-
ing provides an appropriate way to conceptualize adolescence and the
law's role that accords with the moral development literature. Bene-
fits accrue to the minor and the greater society if the minor is permit-
ted to practice making some decisions prior to adulthood.'
61
Adolescents need to practice "making decisions," "taking risks," and
"choosing the path of [their] lives in a free society. ' 162 Autonomy
must be valued, and the law needs to encourage its development dur-
ing adolescence so that it can be appropriately exercised.
63
Professor Zimring does not suggest that all decisions should be
made by adolescents. The development of decision-making authority
should be incremental in nature. 164 And even though the adolescent's
choices should be respected whenever possible, the law must "pre-
serve the life chances for those who make serious mistakes ....
156. See generally Buss, supra note 22, at 158-62, 1287-88; Rosalind Ekman Ladd & Edwin N.
Forman, Adolescent Decision-making: Giving Weight to Age-Specific Values, 16 THEORETICAL
MEDICINE 333, 343 (1995).
157. See LEVESQUE, supra note 4, at 334-37; Roe, supra note 143, at t312-15, 1343.
158. See LEVESQUE, supra note 4, at 342-45.
159. Id.
160. Accord Rosato, Life-Sustaining Treatment, supra note 4, at 10-17 (reaching similar result
in context of refusing life-sustaining treatment). See generally Gary B. Melton, Toward "Per-
sonhood" for Adolescents: Autonomy and Privacy as Values in Public Policy, AM. PSYCHO. 99,
102 (1983) (giving greater autonomy to minors to respect their personhood).
161. See ZIMRING, supra note 94, at 89-96.
162. Id. at 89.
163. Id. at 58-59, 89.
164. Id. at 96, 108-110; accord Gary B. Melton, Parents and Children: Legal Reform to Facili-
tate Children's Participation, AM. PSYCHO. 935, 936 (Nov. 1999).
165. ZIMRING, supra note 94, at 91. The Zimring approach has been cited approvingly in the
First Amendment and juvenile justice contexts. See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court:
Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68,
113-15 (1997); see also Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles:
The Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. EIHICS & PUB. POL'Y 323.
326 (1991) (discussing juvenile justice); Ross, supra note 22, at 258-59 (discussing the First
Amendment).
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The desire to develop autonomy must be balanced against the coun-
tervailing interests of parents and the state. Sometimes a bright-line
age cut off will be appropriate, sometimes individualized competence
determinations will be necessary, and sometimes parental discretion
will suffice. 166 In general, the state or parent should be permitted to
make decisions on behalf of older adolescents only when a compelling
reason exists and the intrusion into the minor's decision-making au-
thority is narrowly circumscribed. 167 For example, preventing serious
physical harm to the minor would justify such an intrusion, 168 but de-
termining a "better life" for the child would not. 69
The most important lesson learned from the developmental litera-
ture is that the law should encourage independent decision-making of
older adolescents, as long as the choice will not cause serious harm to
the adolescent or to others. However, the way the balance should be
struck for different kinds of medical decisions is not clear. The disci-
pline of bioethics can provide some additional guidance.
B. Learning from Bioethics
Bioethics offers another perspective from which to create a more
reality-based quilt of health care decision-making law relating to ado-
lescents. Bioethics is a relevant discipline to consider because it deals
specifically with the moral authority of medical decision-making, in-
cluding the issues of who should make health care decisions and under
what standard. 170 Specifically, the discipline provides us with three
lessons that can assist in reforming existing law: medical decision-
making is contextual; it implicitly involves the exercise of moral au-
thority; and it is patient-centered.
166. See ZIMRING, supra note 94, at 131-32.
167. Cf. Moshman, supra note 150, at 83-87 (burden on government to show, based on rele-
vant empirical evidence, that fundamental right should be denied).
168. See Ladd & Forman, supra note 156, at 343 (limiting adolescents' medical choices where
those choices "might threaten life itself, to the degree that no future at all can be envisioned or
threaten quality of life to a profound degree"); ZIMRINO, supra note 94, at 91 (choice must be
limited to "preserve the life chances for those who make serious mistakes"); cf Rosato, Life-
Sustaining Treatment, supra note 4, at 83-94 (noting a minor's decision regarding life-sustaining
treatment should be respected, unless the treatment "is a nonexperimental life-sustaining treat-
ment that has a significant probability of either curing the condition or disease or alleviating all
of the major symptoms of the condition or disease in the foreseeable future.").
169. See generally LEVESQUE, supra note 4, at 343 (focusing on responsible citizenship in-
volves the freedom and opportunity to choose a life plan and control its implementation); ZIMR-
NG, supra note 94, at 89 (Adolescents should be able to "choos[e] the path of [their] lives in a
free society.").
170. See Rosato, Bioethics, supra note 20, at 30 (stating "bioethics directly addresses the moral
authority of medical decision making, particularly the issues of who should possess authority to
make health care decisions for others and what standard should guide.").
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1. Medical Decision-Making is Contextual
The bioethics approach to medical decision-making is contextual,
involving the balancing of the following core principles: autonomy (re-
spect for persons), beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. 171 In
each case, the decision-maker, whether it is a health care provider or
judge, exercises controlled discretion in determining the weight given
to each value.
172
Ascertaining the patient's competence is an important threshold is-
sue. If the decision-maker determines that the patient is competent to
make the health care decision at issue (which is itself a fact-based de-
termination), 173 then the autonomy principle generally trumps the
other principles: the essential inquiry becomes what the patient wants
rather than what is in her best interests, even if warranted by the be-
neficence principle.
174
The preeminence of autonomy is well-established in common law
and constitutional jurisprudence. 75 In narrow circumstances, auton-
omy must give way to strong countervailing state interests, such as
preserving life, protecting the rights of third parties, protecting the
integrity of the medical profession, or preventing suicide. 176 The facts
in each case need to be carefully considered to determine whether
autonomy is implicated at all and then to determine if a countervailing
reason justifies interfering with the patient's decision.
177
171. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 12
(5th ed. 2001) (arguing that the principles of autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice
should provide the analytical framework in any bioethics situation).
172. See Rosato, Bioethics, supra note 20, at 31-32 (discussing how the decision-maker must
make their decisions through a process of balancing these four principles, without looking to
outside factors).
173. Id. at 32-33 (stating that competence, which is generally defined as a person being able to
understand the risks and benefits of a proposed treatment, is determined on a case by case
basis).
174. See Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 387 (Cal. 1993) (holding that when a competent
person chooses to forego medical treatment, that decision should be respected even if the alter-
native is death).
175. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986) (stating that
the [competent person's] right to refuse treatment is grounded in both the common law and the
constitutional right to privacy); see also In re Fiori, 652 A.2d 1350, 1353 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
176. See Rosato, Bioethics, supra note 20, at 33 (discussing how only in limited circumstances
is the state interest enough to trump the competent person's wishes).
177. See generally Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 634; In re Roche, 687 A.2d 349. 351-52 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1996); Wright v. Johns Hopkins, 728 A.2d 166, 168 (Md. 1999) (discussing how the
right to refuse treatment is not absolute and that the right to autonomy must be considered
along with countervailing state interests).
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2. Medical Decision-Making Implicates Moral Authority
The contextual determinations that must be made in a health care
setting are not usually value-neutral, but involve the exercise of moral
authority. 78 Therefore, moral considerations, as well as medical facts,
must be weighed.
On the moral side, medical decisions may need to balance the pa-
tient's core values, such as when life begins and ends, 7 9 what consti-
tutes a meaningful life,18) and what weight to give altruistic motives.' 8 '
Because these value-laden decisions are seldom supported by a broad
social consensus and are intensely personal, they are best made by the
person who would be most impacted by the decision: the patient, sub-
ject, or donor herself.
182
3. Medical Decision-Making is Patient-Centered
Regardless of the competence of the patient, bioethics emphasizes a
patient-centered approach. When the patient is competent, his wishes
are usually controlling even though the decision may not be the best
one for him and may even lead to his death. And when the patient is
incompetent, the proxy decision-maker may be limited to determining
what the patient would have wanted (substituted judgment) 183 or what
choice is in the patient's best interests.1 84 The interests of third parties
178. See Rosato, Bioethics, supra note 20, at 29 (observing that bioethics is the combination of
a number of disciplines, resulting in a system that "deals with the moral issues of health care and
medicine").
179. See In the Matter of Storar, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 274 (N.Y. 1981). A New York court al-
lowed a guardian to turn off the respirator of an eighty-three year old, terminally ill man, who
had made it clear that prior to becoming incompetent that he did not want to receive artificial
support when there was no hope of recovery. Id.
180. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304-5 (1986) (holding that a twenty-eight
year old woman with severe cerebral palsy, who was completely bedridden and dependent on
others, was permitted to have feeding tube removed, as she was mentally competent enough to
decide what kind of life she wanted to live).
181. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 91-2 (Allegheny County Ct. 1978) (refusing to
order a person to donate their bone marrow against their wishes, saying that to do so would
defeat the sanctity of the individual); see also Jennifer K. Robbennolt et al., Advancing the Rights
of Children and Adolescents to be Altruistic: Bone Marrow Donation By Minors, 9 J.L. &
HEALTH 213, 230 (1994/1995).
t82. See generally Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305 (discussing how courts should not be the ones
to decide what is an acceptable decision for a competent person to make, especially when the
consequences could mean a life of suffering and pain).
183. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 171, at 99-100 (stating that the reasoning
behind substituted judgment is that the actual decision belongs to the incompetent person and,
as such, we should try as much as possible to honor what they would have wanted if able to make
the decision).
184. Id. at 102-03 (explaining how under the best interest standard, the decision-maker needs
to weigh all of the options and determine what is best for the patient, regardless of what they,
themselves, would have wanted).
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(even the significant burdens they might bear) should not be relevant
considerations. 185
IV. A PREVIEW OF THE QUILT
"[T]he critical question is not so much whether children will be
granted absolute autonomy and privacy but instead whether they
will be treated with respect."
1' 86
Health care decisions cannot be analyzed in the same way for pur-
poses of determining what independent decision-making authority
older adolescents should possess. Different kinds of decisions suggest
a different balance of interests. For example, some decisions impli-
cate the minor's core values more than others; some decisions involve
direct benefits to the minor and others do not. The competence litera-
ture remains inconclusive and, thus, is not a determinative factor in
any context. Rough estimates of maturity may be required, however,
where the benefits of creating a bright-line rule for certain decisions
outweigh the harm of including minors who may not meet the requi-
site competence.
In light of these considerations, this Article proposes the following
categorization of cases: abortion, life-sustaining treatment (and other
health care decisions implicating core values), decisions with no direct
medical benefit to the child, and ordinary health care decisions. For
each category, this Article proposes how the lessons learned from de-
velopmental psychology and bioethics can be integrated into the ex-
isting doctrine. These lessons include the following: moral
development should be nurtured by increasing an adolescent's partici-
pation in decision-making, and the relevant inquiry should be contex-
tual and patient-centered to satisfy well-established bioethics
principles.
A. Abortion
STANDARD: For girls aged sixteen and over, access to abortion
should be permitted to the same extent as adult women; for girls
under the age of sixteen, one-parent notice or a judicial bypass pro-
cedure should be permitted.
As discussed earlier,18 7 the existing law governing abortion is mis-
guided and requires change. It is not based on reality and ultimately
185. See generally In re Matter of Dubreuil, 629 So.2d 819, 827-28 (Fla. 1993) (holding that a
woman could not be compelled to have a blood transfusion even if it left open the possibility that
she would die leaving minor children); see also Rosato, Bioethics, supra note 20, at 40-41.
186. See Melton, supra note 164, at 936.
187. See discussion supra notes 22-54 and accompanying text.
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harms the personhood of girls who are forced to become mothers
against their will.188
Moreover, individual determinations of competence have not been
very useful in this context. Under the existing law, any minor who
does not wish to involve her parents must show that she is competent
to make the decision on her own or that an abortion is in her best
interests. 189 But judges understandably have found it difficult to dif-
ferentiate between mature and immature minors in this context. 190 In
jurisdictions in which the bypass process has been studied, most peti-
tions based on maturity have been granted. 191 These results reveal a
problem that is unique to the abortion context: it is difficult to con-
clude that a minor is too immature to have an abortion yet mature
enough to raise a child. 1
92
The reality is that the ability to make abortion decisions is not really
about capacity in most cases. Instead, it is about who should possess
the power in our society to make reproductive decisions. 193 And it is
made in a political climate that is increasingly anti-choice.
The proposed law reflects the principle that the older adolescent
should make moral decisions for herself unless there is a strong inter-
est to the contrary. Consistent with the principles of bioethics, the
authority to make health care decisions ordinarily resides with the pa-
tient. It is even more important to do so when the decision involves
core values, as abortion clearly does. An abortion decision is a reflec-
tion of the girl's views as to when life begins and how she wants to live
her life.' 94 A teen mom faces a number of long-term effects of the
choice that she has made, including a greater chance of ending up in
poverty with poor academic performance and a failed marriage. 195
For these reasons, the proposal provides that girls, aged sixteen and
over, be permitted to make this important decision to the same extent
as adult women. 96 For these girls, autonomy should be the overriding
188. Id.
189. See discussion supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
190. See Britner et al., supra note 37, at 58.
191. See Ehrlich, Reproductive Fairness, supra note 23, at 18; cf. Planned Parenthood v.
Farmer, 762 A.2d 620, 637 (N.J. 2000) (noting experience of courts in Minnesota and Massachu-
setts of granting most petitions).
192. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 474 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
193. See Jennifer Soper, Comment. Straddling the Line: Adolescent Pregnancy and Questions
of Capacity, 23 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 194, 214-15 (1999).
194. See discussion supra notes 33, 41 and accompanying text.
195. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Committee on Adolescence, Adolescent Pregnancy-Cur-
rent Trends and Issues: 1998, 103 PEDIATRiCS 516 (1998).
196. Cf. Martha Minow, The Role of Families in Medical Decisions, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 1, 23-
24 (finding that a minor should be trusted to make the abortion decision on her own); Am. Ass'n
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principle. The state's interests are not sufficiently strong to override
the girls' choices' 97 because its interest in the preservation of the life
of the unborn is no greater than exists when an adult woman seeks an
abortion. Moreover, the interests of third parties are not sufficiently
strong when the child reaches older adolescence. 98 Even the parents'
interests in protecting the minor against her own immature decisions
are diminished where the proposed age cut-off exceeds the estimates
of maturity proposed by developmental psychologists. 199
For girls under age sixteen, the proposed law seeks a compromise
between competing values. Girls under the age of sixteen are more
likely to be immature and in need of the support and guidance of
adults, presumptively their parents. At the same time, when a sup-
portive adult is not available, a bypass procedure must be provided
that accords with constitutional principles and is not simply a way to
further the state's pro-life values. Generally, any bypass procedure
should be viewed from the teenager's perspective, as in Farmer. Spe-
cifically, consent and two-parent notice statutes should be viewed with
suspicion, as one-parent notice should be sufficient to satisfy the
state's concerns.
B. Life-Sustaining Treatment Decisions (and Other Health Care
Decisions Involving Core Values)
STANDARD: Any minor seeking to consent to or refuse life-sus-
taining treatment must demonstrate to a health care provider (or a
judge, if no resolution is possible with the health care provider) his
or her competence to make the decision. If found competent, the
minor may refuse or consent to the treatment, unless the state can
demonstrate a compelling interest to deny decision-making
authority.
As this Article has previously argued, decisions regarding life-sus-
taining treatment involve the patient's core values and, as such, defer-
ence should be given to a mature minor's decisions in this area.
20
And because these cases do not arise frequently, an individual deter-
mination of competence is a practical and effective way to determine
which minors should be permitted to make these decisions.201 The
of Pediatrics, Committee on Adolescence, The Adolescent's Rights to Confidential Care When
Considering Abortion (1996) (noting that adolescents should be permitted to make abortion
decision without parental or court intervention).
197. The state's interests are articulated supra notes 176-177 and accompanying text.
198. See discussion supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
199. See discussion supra note 106 and accompanying text.
200. Rosato, Life-Sustaining Treatment, supra note 4, at 14-16.
201. Id. at 50.
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neutral decision-maker should examine a number of criteria to assess
whether the minor "understands the illness and treatment alterna-
tives," "whether the minor has the capacity of rational decision-mak-
ing[,] and whether the minor has the ability to make and communicate
a choice. '20 2
Although the state generally possesses a strong interest in preserv-
ing life, such an interest would not be compelling in this context unless
the minor's decision would threaten her life or cause permanent phys-
ical harm. For example, the state could trump the minor's choice if
she refused a life-saving transfusion or insulin injections that control
her diabetes.
20 3
Minors need to "choose their path in a free society, '2 04 which in-
cludes making decisions about the quality of their lives. Refusal of
life-sustaining treatment is an expression of a certain quality of life,
and it is the minor who ultimately must bear the consequences of the
decision. To deny minors this decision-making authority, as the ex-
isting doctrine currently does, is inconsistent with autonomy.
20 5
This proposed approach to life-sustaining treatment decisions
should extend to other health care decisions that implicate core val-
ues, even though they may not involve life-sustaining treatment. Ex-
amples include whether a minor should receive surgery to correct
scoliosis,2 0 6 whether a limb should be amputated,207 or whether the
minor should be institutionalized in a mental health facility.
20 8
C. Decisions with No Direct Physical Benefit to the Child
STANDARD: A minor aged sixteen and older should be permitted to
consent to non-beneficial treatment (e.g., as research subject or do-
nor), as long as the proposed procedure is unlikely to pose more
than a minimal risk.
Consistent with moral development theory, pro-social values, such
as altruism, should be nurtured during adolescence.20 9 By permitting
a minor to agree to serve as a research subject and help other people
202. Id. at 64-67. The Article proposes that the criteria be shown by clear and convincing
evidence, which may be a difficult hurdle to overcome in some cases.
203. Id. at 83-94.
204. See discussion supra notes 161-163 and accompanying text.
205. See discussion supra notes 142-169 and accompanying text.
206. See In re Green, 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972) (remanding to determine minor's views about
surgery to correct scoliosis).
207. See Ladd & Forman, supra note 156, at 343.
208. See Rosato, Bioethics, supra note 20, at 45.
209. See discussion supra notes 142-169 and accompanying text.
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or to donate bone marrow to an ailing sibling, both the minor and
society at large will benefit.
210
The existing law does not permit minors to express these values on
their own or against their parents' wishes. Minors are permitted to
become donors only if they will receive some tangible benefit from the
process, either physical or psychological. 21' Moreover, even the oldest
adolescents are not permitted to consent to participate in clinical tri-
als. Parents must consent to non-beneficial research that poses even a
minimal risk to the minor.2 12
Allowing older adolescents (ages sixteen and older) to consent to
even a limited number of non-beneficial decisions would strike the
right balance between protecting minors and encouraging altruism. A
bright-line rule is offered because an individualized determination in
each instance is not feasible, this group is likely to be sufficiently com-
petent,213 and they are likely to benefit from the experience of helping
others.
Consistent with Zimring's learner's permit approach, 21 4 minors can
only give consent to non-beneficial treatment that is unlikely to pose
more than a minimal risk. 21 5 This standard helps prepare adolescents
for making more significant decisions upon reaching adulthood while
ensuring that they will not subject themselves to a great risk with little
or no hope of a tangible benefit. As a society, we must practice what
we preach. We cannot expect children to grow up into altruistic adults
if we have not adequately trained them to make some of these choices
before reaching adulthood.
21 6
D. Ordinary Health Care Decisions
STANDARD: For ordinary health care decisions, minors should be
encouraged to participate by being provided with relevant medical
information and having their views respectfully considered. Where
210. Id.
211. See Rosato, Bioethics, supra note 20, at 45.
212. See Rosato, Clinical Trials, supra note 7, at 364 (summarizing law).
213. In the research context, the medical decision-making developmental literature has been
used to assess competence. See Weir & Peters, supra note 108, at 31. In the proposed guidelines
for Adolescent Health Research, minors would be able to consent to research that does not
involve a greater than minimal risk to her. See Guidelines for Adolescent Health Research, 17 J.
ADOLESCENT HEALTH 264, 265-66 (Nov. 1995).
214. See discussion supra notes 161-169 and accompanying text.
215. Lois A. Weithorn & David G. Scherer, Children's Involvement in Research Participation
Decisions: Psychological Considerations, at 147-55, and Esther H. Wender, Assessment of Risk to
Children, at 181-92, in CHILDREN AS RESEARCH SUBJECTS: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND THE LAW
(Michael A. Grodin & Leonard H. Glantz, eds., 1994).
216. Cf Roe, supra note 143, at 1316.
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minors and parents disagree, the parents should be permitted to
make these kinds of health care decisions for their minor children,
provided that the parents do not have a conflict of interest that
would interfere with their ability to make a decision in their child's
best interests and their actions/omissions would not violate applica-
ble abuse or neglect laws.
For ordinary health care decisions, the need for autonomy is re-
duced because the minor's core values are not at stake. In most cases,
a minor's developing identity does not depend on whether an antibi-
otic is taken or a broken bone is set, and the need for medical inter-
vention is not in dispute.
217
Moreover, it is important for health care to be provided to children
in an effective and efficient manner. An individualized competence
determination cannot be made each time a child goes to the doctor,
and in this age of managed care the doctor's office needs to know at
the time of the visit that the medical bill will be paid.218 Designating
the parent as the responsible decision-maker will help ensure these
results because parents generally protect their child's health and will
act in their best interests.2
19
Even though the parental and state interests may not be considered
compelling, they should be sufficient in most circumstances to out-
weigh the reduced autonomy interest implicated in ordinary health
care decisions.220 As such, parents generally should make these deci-
sions for the minor. But if the parents possess a conflict of interest
that would interfere with their ability to make a decision in their
child's best interests, then a neutral third-party decision-maker (such
as a doctor or judge) must determine what is in the minor's best inter-
ests. For example, there could be emotional or financial conflicts. 22'
Even if minors do not possess decision-making authority to make
ordinary health care decisions, they should be active participants in
the decision-making process. 222 For example, Professor Gary Melton
217. An exception would be when a minor or her parent refuses medical treatment for relig-
ious reasons. See, e.g., Daniel Billent, The Prosecution of Christian Scientists: A Needed Protec-
tion for Children or Insult Added to Injury, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 479, 481 (2000) (discussing how
Christian Scientists resist modern medicine because they think illness is the result of error in
thinking, and drugs continue the errors, preventing the person from getting better).
218. See generally Melton, supra note 164, at 938 (noting that parents' payment is a relevant
consideration).
219. See Rosato, Bioethics, supra note 20, at 38-39.
220. See Scott, supra note 4, at 560.
221. See Rosato, Bioethics, supra note 20, at 43-49.
222. See Melton, supra note 164, at 940-42; accord Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Committee on
Bioethics, Informed Consent, Parental Permission and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIAT-




has proposed an approach that would provide information to the mi-
nor and ask for her opinion throughout the process, even if it is not
binding.223 Using a participatory model, competence and moral de-
velopment will be encouraged.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the state of the competence literature remains inconclu-
sive, a change in existing law cannot wait any longer.22 4 The proposal
set forth in this Article is designed to be a textured quilt with patches
that are reflective of the lessons learned from the competence litera-
ture, moral development theory, and bioethics principles. Although
recent literature shows promise, more empirical research must be
done in this area. In the meantime, we must begin to give some deci-
sion-making authority to older adolescents. To begin to recognize this
group as qualitatively different than younger children will respect the
minor's personhood and yield positive results for the minor, her fam-
ily, and the society-at-large. Dismantling the presumption of incom-
petence in the health care decision-making context is a good place to
start.
223. Melton, supra note 164, at 942.
224. See generally Buss, supra note 9, at 919.
[Developmental psychology offers] a general picture of how we change as we grow up.
[Lawyers then must] determine when bright-line rules are justified despite the lack of
developmental clarity, when society is better off with discretionary standards that defer
to the decision-maker's assessments of an individual child's capacity, and to what extent
extra developmental considerations also should be given weight.
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